ESSAY

RECONSIDERING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE:
FORTY-FIVE YEARS IN THE TRENCHES
AND IN THE TOWER

STEPHEN B. BURBANK†
Judicial independence is in the air—again. Although I had not worked on
or written about that subject directly since 2007,1 I have participated in, or
will participate in, four programs about judicial independence within one
year. Thinking about the topic for these events has caused me to realize that
issues concerning judicial independence have been an important part of my
life as a lawyer, scholar, and engaged citizen since the beginning of my career
more than forty years ago. Indeed, had I harbored any doubt about the
reasons for the recent resurgence of interest in judicial independence,
revisiting my own experience would have resolved it.
Trusting in the integrity of our institutions when they are not under
stress, we focus attention on them when they are under stress or when we
need them to protect us against other institutions. In the case of the federal
judiciary, the two conditions often coincide. In this Essay, I aim to provide
practical context for some of the important lessons to be learned from the
periods of stress for the federal judiciary that I have observed as a lawyer

† David Berger Professor for the Administration of Justice, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
This essay is a revised and expanded version of the author’s keynote address at the Stanford Law Review’s
2019 symposium: “The Independence of the American Judicial System: Politics and Separation of Powers.”
1 I participated in “Fair and Independent Courts: A Conference on the State of the
Judiciary” at the Georgetown Law School in 2006. See generally Stephen B. Burbank, Judicial
Independence, Judicial Accountability, and Interbranch Relations, 95 GEO. L.J. 909 (2007) (arguing
that the main cause of strained relations between the judiciary and the political branches is the
use of strategies intended to persuade the public that judges are and should be policy agents). As
is evident from the latter half of this Essay, however, insights developed while working on the
subject directly have informed my scholarship on other issues.
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and concerned citizen and to provide theoretical context for lessons I have
deemed significant as a scholar.
I start with my personal experience of Watergate, which gave both
immediacy and abiding signiﬁcance to the principle that no person is above
the law, aﬀecting my attitudes towards and participation in other cases,
including cases pending today, where that principle has been put to the test.
I then trace lessons learned after writing rules to govern federal judicial
conduct and disability proceedings and serving on a national commission
investigating impeachment of federal judges and its alternatives. By far the
most important of those lessons is the central role that judicial accountability
plays in enabling judicial independence.
In the latter half of the Essay, I explore some of the theoretical
implications that, with the help of interdisciplinary research, I derived from
these experiences and from defending judges against attacks by politicians
and interest groups. It shows that over the last decade or so, my work on and
writing about judicial independence and accountability informed my
scholarship on matters as disparate as theories of judicial behavior, term limits
for Supreme Court justices, and the role of the Supreme Court in retrenching
private enforcement of federal law.
****
I had the privilege of clerking for Chief Justice Warren Burger during the
October Term 1974. On my ﬁrst day of work in July of that year, I spent the
morning ﬁlling out forms. Having had lunch in the Court’s cafeteria, I
returned to my oﬃce. Shortly thereafter, a messenger arrived with a large
envelope, which he gave to me, saying that the Chief Justice had asked me to
proofread the enclosed opinion. It was, of course, United States v. Nixon,2 the
Court’s decision requiring compliance with a subpoena for tape-recorded
conversations in the Oval Oﬃce, which precipitated President Nixon’s
resignation and the end to a “long national nightmare.”3
For many of my generation, Watergate was woven into the fabric of our
legal and civic education. For some, the experience was more personal than
for others. Archibald Cox, the Watergate Special Prosecutor and primary

2 418 U.S. 683 (1974). I had forgotten how quickly after the Court’s decision President Nixon
resigned (only 16 days later, the day after a national address on August 8).
3 This was Gerald Ford’s characterization in remarks upon taking the oath of office
on August 9, 1974: “My fellow Americans, our long national nightmare is over.”
Gerald R. Ford, Remarks Upon Taking the Oath of Office as President (Aug. 9, 1974),
https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/speeches/740001.asp [https://perma.cc/R47Q-X2CA].
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target of what became known as the Saturday Night Massacre,4 was my
teacher and mentor. So also, in diﬀerent ways, was Chief Justice Burger.
Because of Watergate, the principle that no person is above the law was
burned into my consciousness, as also the realization that, there being no
guarantee that the President would obey the Court’s decision, whether he did
so might depend on the public’s support for judicial independence.
Two decades later, this experience of Watergate caused me to do
something unpopular in certain liberal legal circles, namely, to help write and
to sign an amicus curiae brief arguing that President Clinton did not enjoy
immunity against federal civil litigation brought by Paula Jones concerning
alleged misconduct before he assumed oﬃce.5 The Court unanimously
sustained that position in Clinton v. Jones.6 And two decades after that, it has
caused me to join with two other professors who signed the brief in Clinton
v. Jones in amicus curiae briefs arguing that President Trump does not enjoy
immunity from state court civil litigation concerning his alleged misconduct
before assuming oﬃce.7 Although these briefs have elicited quite a diﬀerent
reaction from liberals, it has been my pleasure to demonstrate that the
principle that no person is above the law is non-partisan.8
****
Just as the experience of Watergate shaped my understanding of the
central role that judicial independence and separation of powers play in the
preservation of our democratic way of life, so also did personal experience
and the scholarly paths it opened up shape my understanding of the central
role that judicial accountability plays in enabling judicial independence.

4 This became the name for the events of Saturday, October 20, 1973, when President Nixon
ordered Elliott Richardson, the Attorney General, and then William Ruckelshaus, the Deputy Attorney
General, to fire Cox, and both refused and resigned; the third person receiving that order, Robert Bork,
who was Solicitor General, complied and fired Cox. Carroll Kilpatrick, Nixon Forces Firing of Cox:
Richardson, Ruckelshaus Quit, WASH. POST (Oct. 21, 1973), https://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/national/longterm/watergate/articles/102173-2.htm [https://perma.cc/2G7B-WZ3X].
5 See generally Brief Amicus Curiae of Law Professors in Support of Respondent, Clinton v.
Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997) (No. 95-1853), 1996 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 572. Many of the signatories
of an amicus brief ﬁled in support of President Clinton were part of those “liberal legal circles.” See
generally Brief Amicus Curiae of Law Professors in Support of Petitioner, Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S.
681 (1997) (No. 95-1853), 1996 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 501.
6 520 U.S. 681 (1997). Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment. Id. at 710 (Breyer, J., concurring).
7 See generally Brief of Law Professors as Amici Curiae, Zervos v. Trump, 74 N.Y.S.3d 442 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 2018); Brief of Amici Law Professors, People v. Trump, 88 N.Y.S.3d 830 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2018).
8 “The principle for which Clinton v. Jones stands is bipartisan and deserves disinterested
champions.” Stephen B. Burbank, Richard D. Parker & Lucas A. Powe, Jr., The President is Not Above
the Law, POLITICO (Oct. 18, 2018), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/10/18/presidentabove-the-law-trump-clinton-221579 [https://perma.cc/Z9S7-DZ7K].
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When I was in my second year as a full-time faculty member at Penn Law,
the Chief Judge of the Third Circuit asked me to serve as co-reporter for a
committee of judges charged to write the rules of that circuit implementing the
Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980.9 The
product of a long legislative process that included the kind of thoughtful
discussion and debate about issues of institutional prerogative and constitutional
law that are sadly missing from contemporary congressional deliberations, this
statute established a process and some rules for filing complaints alleging
misconduct or disability against Article III judges other than Supreme Court
justices.10 What could I do other than cheerfully accept the invitation?
The work required, or so I believed, a deep dive into the history of the
1980 legislation, which ended up including unfettered access to the ﬁles of
the Director of Legislative Aﬀairs for the Administrative Oﬃce of the United
States Courts. That individual was concerned—not without reason—that
failure of the circuits to take seriously their responsibilities under the Act
might lead Congress to replace the model of decentralized administrative
handling of complaints that emerged from that long legislative process; most
likely to take its place was a centralized model, like that used in many states,
that some inﬂuential senators favored.11 The experience of hammering out
the compromises underlying the 1980 Act had persuaded him that, however
apt such a central commission model might be for states, many of whose
judges are elected, it likely would portend a degree of judicial accountability
that was inimical to the historic role of federal courts and federal judges. I
came to believe that he was right.
My work on the Third Circuit’s rules led to requests to consult for
committees of the Judicial Conference,12 where, having become a champion of
9 Pub. L. No. 96-458, 94 Stat. 2035 (1980) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 351–364 (2012)).
My co-reporter was Daniel Segal, Esq.
10 See generally Stephen B. Burbank, Procedural Rulemaking Under the Judicial Councils
Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, 131 U. P A. L. R EV. 283, 283-88, 291-300
(1982) (describing the history of the Act).
11 See id. at 291-94 (discussing bills that included a central commission).
12 These requests were undoubtedly precipitated by the general tenor of my article on
rulemaking under the 1980 Act, which is captured in the observation that the “alternative to
central judicial leadership may be further action by Congress.” See id. at 347. That leadership
first manifested in the non-binding Illustrative Rules, which were prepared in 1986 and
subsequently revised and amended. Following the 2006 report of the Judicial Conduct and
Disability Act Study Committee (the so-called “Breyer Committee”), the Judicial Conference
finally promulgated binding rules in 2008, which were amended in 2015 and again on March 12,
2019. For the history and current rules, see 2 Guide to Judiciary Policy, pt. E, ch. 3 (2019),
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/judicial_conduct_and_disability_rules_effective_ma
rch_12_2019_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/HWN5-CQLW]. See also Editorial, More Progress (and
Politics) in Federal Judicial Accountability, 91 JUDICATURE 268, 268-69 (2008) (discussing new
rules, made mandatory by the Judicial Conference, incorporating many recommendations of the
Breyer Committee); Editorial, Politics and Progress in Federal Judicial Accountability, 90
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judicial accountability as the judiciary’s friend, I was regarded by some as the
bearer of bad news. Moreover, those experiences and the scholarship they
enabled put me in a position to contribute, as a scholar and public citizen, to
the reconsideration of judicial impeachment,13 a topic that roiled the Senate in
the mid-1980s, prompting calls for either legislation or a constitutional
amendment that would ease the burdens of the legislative branch when
confronted by judges who refused to resign notwithstanding felony convictions
or other powerful evidence of misbehavior. Believing that such calls were at
best premature and at worst misguided, I published an article calling for the
creation of a national commission to reconsider impeachment and its
alternatives.14 To my surprise, Congress established such a commission,15 and
the Speaker of the House of Representatives appointed me as a member.16
The National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal pursued
an ambitious multi-method research program and in 1993 issued its report, of
which I had the privilege to be a principal author.17 Rejecting arguments that
removal could constitutionally be eﬀected other than through the
impeachment process,18 as well as uninformed criticism of experience under
the 1980 Act,19 the Commission made detailed recommendations to each
branch of government. An overarching goal of these recommendations was to
facilitate responses to problems of judicial misconduct and disability that did

JUDICATURE 52, 53, 92 (2006) (discussing the report of the Breyer Committee). The author was
chair of the Editorial Committee of the American Judicature Society for many years and drafted
these editorials. See infra note 32 and accompanying text.
13 See generally Stephen B. Burbank, Alternative Career Resolution: An Essay on the Removal of
Federal Judges, 76 KY. L.J. 643, 643-50 (1988).
14 See generally Stephen B. Burbank, Is it Time for a National Commission on Judicial Independence and
Accountability?, 73 JUDICATURE 176 (1990). The idea originated with Senator Dole and, after languishing
in the Senate, was picked up by Representative Kastenmeier. See Burbank, supra note 13, at 699-700.
15 Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5124 (1990).
16 See REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE & REMOVAL
(1993) (“Members of the Commission”).
17 See id. at iii-v (describing the creation of the Commission and the Commission’s
methodology, which included comprehensive academic research, public hearings, and roundtable
discussions). For a more detailed discussion of the Commission’s work, see generally Stephen B.
Burbank & S. Jay Plager, Foreword: The Law of Federal Judicial Discipline and the Lessons of Social
Science, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1993).
18 REPORT, supra note 16, at 17-20.
19 Id. at 83-127. The Commission concluded its chapter on the judicial branch, of which I was
the principal author, as follows:
Unjustiﬁed suspicion of the ethics and conduct of federal judges or of the federal
judiciary’s commitment to eﬀective self-regulation is harmful to the rule of law and a
threat to judicial independence. The judiciary thus has a direct institutional interest
in a system of self-regulation that is not only eﬀective but perceived to be eﬀective.
Id. at 127.
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not, in the name of efficiency or from failure to see the forest for the trees,
unduly disrupt institutional compromises forged over two centuries.20
****
All of these experiences proved important when, in the late 1990s, I
undertook deeper scholarly engagement with the concept of judicial
independence. Alas, again, one of these efforts was greeted as bad news, to wit,
my contribution to a festschrift celebrating Judge Jack Weinstein’s thirtieth
year on the federal bench. In that article, I argued that central to Weinstein’s
self-image as a federal judge were conceptions of independence and
accountability that he brought with him from his time as a tenured faculty
member at Columbia Law School—conceptions that, I maintained, were
inconsistent with his responsibilities as a lower court judge and as part of the
judiciary as an institution.21 In fairness, I did try to turn down this invitation,
but I was persuaded not to do so by the organizer of the symposium and the
judge himself, neither of whom apparently could believe that, upon sober
reflection, my stated misgivings would not be overcome by appreciation of the
judge’s brilliance and imagination (qualities that I celebrated in my article).
“Deeper scholarly engagement with the concept of judicial independence”
included systematic reading in the literatures of other disciplines, notably
political science. As a result, I concluded that discussions and debates about
judicial independence had produced more heat than light and that scholars
in different disciplines had been talking past one another.22 A few years
See id. at 147-55 (listing conclusions and recommendations).
See Stephen B. Burbank, The Courtroom as Classroom: Independence, Imagination and Ideology in
the Work of Jack Weinstein, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1971, 1982-93 (1997) (“In matters pertaining to judicial
accountability, Judge Weinstein is a strict constructionist, parsing statutes and denying claims of
inherent power of appellate courts in a fashion and with an attitude quite different from that which
characterizes his own exercises of power.”). This article prompted Professor Neuborne, for whom it
was bad news, to write a reply. See Burt Neuborne, Innovation in the Interstices of the Final Judgment Rule:
A Demurrer to Professor Burbank, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2091, 2091 (1997) (“[T]he federal ‘final judgment’
system, which places strict limits on interlocutory appeals, requires and encourages trial judge
innovation as a means of balancing the just, the good, and the formal elements of law.”).
22 See Stephen B. Burbank, The Architecture of Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 315, 32630 (1999) [hereinafter Architecture] (discussing theoretical approaches to defining and understanding
judicial independence). Indeed, the same was true of scholars within the same discipline:
20
21

Imagine my surprise when, having learned from one group of political scientists that Supreme
Court justices are accountable to elected politicians and thus that judicial independence is a
myth, I learned from another group of political scientists that Supreme Court justices are
wholly independent, and thus that judicial accountability is a myth.
Stephen B. Burbank, On the Study of Judicial Behaviors: Of Law, Politics, Science and Humility, in WHAT’S
LAW GOT TO DO WITH IT?: WHAT JUDGES DO, WHY THEY DO IT, AND WHAT’S AT STAKE 41, 4647 (Charles Gardner Geyh ed., 2011) [hereinafter On the Study of Judicial Behaviors] (citations omitted).
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later, Barry Friedman and I convened a conference of some thirty
prominent academics with backgrounds spanning the disciplines of law,
economics, history, and political science to discuss what we knew about
judicial independence. In a chapter of the book that emerged from the
conference, 23 and in a free-standing article,24 I sought to demonstrate that
judicial independence is the other side of the coin from judicial
accountability; that neither is an end in itself but rather a means to an end
(or variety of ends); that the relevant ends relate not primarily to individual
judicial performance but rather to the performance of courts and court
systems; and that there is no one ideal mix of independence and
accountability, but rather that the right mix depends upon the goals of
those responsible for institutional architecture with respect to
a particular court or court system.
The U.S. Constitution does not refer to “judicial independence,” which is
itself evidence of a proposition essential to proper understanding of the term,
namely that judicial independence is a means to an end, not an end in itself.25
Put otherwise, in its positive dimensions, judicial independence is not an
operative legal concept but rather a way of describing the consequences of legal
arrangements. In the case of federal judges, the pertinent legal arrangements
are the Constitution’s provisions for life tenure and secure compensation. Yet,
scholarship has made it plain that these formal protections of federal judicial
independence pale in comparison with formal powers that might be deployed
to control federal courts. Rather, as the work of Charles Geyh in particular
demonstrates,26 the traditional equilibrium between the federal judiciary and
the other branches owes its existence to informal norms and customs, such as
that against using the impeachment process in response to judicial decisions27
23 Stephen B. Burbank & Barry Friedman, Reconsidering Judicial Independence, in JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 9 (Stephen B.
Burbank & Barry Friedman eds., 2002).
24 Stephen B. Burbank, What Do We Mean by “Judicial Independence”?, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 323 (2003)
[hereinafter What Do We Mean?]; see also Burbank, Architecture, supra note 22, at 318-26, 339-49
(describing approaches to judicial independence, including the idea that judicial independence and
judicial accountability are two sides of the same coin); Stephen B. Burbank, The Past and Present of Judicial
Independence, 80 JUDICATURE 117, 117-18 (1996) (“It should be impossible, except perhaps for a lawyer, to
think about [judicial independence] without thinking about [judicial accountability].”).
25 “Attention to the core of judicial independence can obscure the view that, apart from
enabling judicial review, it is instrumental to the resolution of ordinary cases according to law.”
Burbank, Architecture, supra note 22, at 336.
26 See id. at 321-26 (describing the norm against the political branches using tools like
impeachment, jurisdiction-stripping, and court-packing to control the judicial branch). See generally
CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, WHEN COURTS & CONGRESS COLLIDE: THE STRUGGLE FOR
CONTROL OF AMERICA’S JUDICIAL SYSTEM (2006) (exploring the federal judiciary’s relationship
with Congress and arguing that judicial independence is attributable more to institutional norms
than to constitutional structure).
27 GEYH, supra note 26, at 113-70.
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and that against court-packing as a means of ensuring decisions in accord with
the preferences of the dominant coalition.28
Understanding that judicial independence is not an end in itself is perhaps
easiest if one considers whether any society would seek to establish courts that
were completely independent, such that they were free to decide cases as they
saw fit, without any constraint.29 Going down that path enables one quickly to
grasp another essential proposition, which is that judicial independence and
judicial accountability are not discrete concepts at war with each other. They
are complements or, again, different sides of the same coin. An accountable
judiciary without any independence is weak and feeble. An independent
judiciary without any accountability is dangerous. In thinking about the level
of executive, legislative, or popular influence that is compatible with a desired
level of independence, we are thinking about accountability.
From these premises one can derive a number of additional propositions.30
First, judicial accountability has as many roles to play as judicial independence.
As a result, judicial accountability should serve to moderate what would
otherwise be unacceptable decisional independence (i.e., decisions unchecked
by law as generally understood or, in the case of inferior courts, by the prospect
or reality of appellate review). In addition, judicial accountability should
moderate other judicial behavior that is hostile to or inconsistent with the
ability of courts to achieve the role(s) envisioned for them in the particular
polity (for example, in the words of the 1980 Act, “conduct prejudicial to the
effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts”31).
Second, just as independence must be conceived in relation to other actors
(independence from whom or what?), so must accountability (accountability
to whom or what?). As a result, judicial accountability should run to the
public, including litigants whose disputes courts resolve and who, therefore,
have a legitimate interest in court proceedings that are open to the public and
in judicial decisions that are accessible. Judicial accountability should also run
to the people’s representatives, who appropriate the funds for the judiciary
and whose laws the courts interpret and apply. As a result, they have a
legitimate interest in ensuring that the judiciary has been responsible in
spending the allotted funds and that, as interpreted and applied by the courts,
public laws are functioning as intended. Finally, judicial accountability should
run to courts and the judiciary as an institution, both because individual judicial
independence exists primarily for the benefit of institutional independence and
Id. at 66-70, 77-91.
“One implication of this proposition is that, from a pre-modern, anthropological
perspective, we need law to constrain judges rather than judges to serve the rule of law.” Burbank,
What Do We Mean?, supra note 24, at 326.
30 See Burbank, supra note 1, at 912-13 (setting out the propositions that follow).
31 28 U.S.C. § 351 (2012).
28
29
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because appropriate intrabranch accountability is essential if potentially
inappropriate interbranch accountability is to be avoided. In each instance,
proper regard for the other side of the coin—that is, for judicial independence—
requires that accountability not entail influence that is deemed to be undue.
****

The ﬁrst decade of the new millennium found me spending a lot of time
on judicial independence and accountability quite apart from the theoretical
writing just described. Again, experience in the trenches helped to shape my
views in the tower. As chair of the Editorial Committee for the late,
lamented American Judicature Society in the 2000–2008 period, it largely fell
to me to craft the Society’s responses in the pages of Judicature to a series of
attacks on or attempts to control federal (and state) courts and judges.32
Doing so enabled me to see that those attacks and attempts to control
reﬂected a debased notion of judicial accountability implicit in a view of
judges as policy agents.33 Moreover, with the beneﬁt of the political science
32 See Editorial, An Earthquake in South Dakota?, 89 JUDICATURE 192, 192 (2006) (describing a
proposed state constitutional amendment that would allow judges defending civil suits arising from
their judicial acts to be stripped of their immunity or even to face criminal indictment); Editorial,
Clinton’s Legacy or Bork’s?, 84 JUDICATURE 224, 224 (2001) (criticizing the treatment of all federal
judicial appointments as if they were Supreme Court appointments or as part of normal politics);
Editorial, Judges, Ideology, and Accountability, 85 JUDICATURE 212, 212-13 (2002) (“Just as we should
stop pretending that the policy preferences of potential appointees are or should be irrelevant in the
selection process, so should we avoid the fallacy of assimilating the politics of federal judicial selection
to normal politics.”); Editorial, Judicial Accountability, 89 JUDICATURE 4, 4 (2005) (emphasizing that,
though judicial accountability is important, “heavy-handed programs implemented under the banner
of ‘accountability’ are the enemy of the kind of independence that we should want in our judges.”);
Editorial, Judicial Independence at the Crossroads, 85 JUDICATURE 260, 260 (2002) (calling for more
interdisciplinary research into the structures and incentives that promote judicial independence and
accountability); Editorial, Listening to Judge Lefkow, 88 JUDICATURE 240, 240 (2005) (calling on
public officials to refrain from inflammatory rhetoric when discussing the judiciary); Editorial, More
Progress (and Politics) in Federal Judicial Accountability, supra note 12, at 268 (praising the Rules for
Judicial-Conduct and Judicial-Disability Proceedings as a system of self-regulation that promotes
judicial accountability); Editorial, Politics and Progress in Federal Judicial Accountability, supra note 12,
at 52-53 (commending three initiatives of the federal judiciary intended to address congressional
concerns about judicial accountability); Editorial, Separation of Powers and Mutual Respect, 87
JUDICATURE 200, 200 (2004) (calling on the judicial and legislative branches to avoid inflammatory
rhetoric about each other); Editorial, The Judicial Independence and Accountability Task Force, 88
JUDICATURE 108, 108 (2004) (describing the creation and activities of the American Judicature
Society’s Judicial Independence and Accountability Task Force); Editorial, The War on Courts and
Other Wars, 90 JUDICATURE 148, 148 (2007) (criticizing jurisdiction-stripping measures that treat
judges as policy agents of the current political majority); Editorial, Three Branches, Not Two: Congress
Should Reconsider Recent Assaults on Federal Sentencing Discretion, 86 JUDICATURE 276, 276 (2003)
(criticizing legislation that limited sentencing discretion).
33 Editorial, Judicial Accountability, supra note 32, at 4-5; Burbank, supra note 1, at 910; Editorial,
Politics and Progress in Federal Judicial Accountability, supra note 12, at 52; Editorial, The War on Courts
and Other Wars, supra note 32, at 148.
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literatures on public knowledge of and attitudes towards courts as well as on
the behavior of interest groups, it seemed to me that, if those on the front
lines of the war on courts succeeded in persuading the public to view judges
as policy agents and courts as part of ordinary politics, it might be impossible
to maintain (or return to) the traditional equilibrium. The informal norms
and customs which enable that equilibrium were forged and sustained in the
shadow of what political scientists refer to as the public’s diﬀuse support for
the courts34—support that persists even in the face of unpopular decisions,
where so-called speciﬁc support is lacking.35
In light of those literatures, there was reason to fear that the distinction
between diﬀuse support and speciﬁc support would disappear, with the public
asking of the judiciary not, “What does the law require?” but rather, “What
have you done for me lately?”36 In such a system, law itself would be seen as
nothing more than ordinary politics, and it would become increasingly
difficult to appoint, elect, or retain people with the qualities necessary for
judicial independence, because the actors involved would be preoccupied with
a degraded notion of judicial accountability. At the end of the day, judicial
independence would become a junior partner to judicial accountability, or the
partnership would be dissolved.
The work of these years on judicial independence and accountability,
practical and theoretical, proved influential when, in 2008, I was asked to
participate in an interdisciplinary conference on what judges do, why they
do it, and what’s at stake, and to contribute a chapter to the volume that
emerged from the conference:37
What, then, do I see as the state of current knowledge about judicial
behavior? The framework I have chosen to describe it is drawn from
work on judicial independence and accountability . . . . Accountability to
law is an important source of constraint (or self-restraint) posited by
those who resist claims that judges are completely independent to decide
as they wish. A putative dichotomy between independence and
accountability thus maps well on to a putative dichotomy between
“judicial politics,” defined for this purpose as the pursuit of a judge’s preferences
on matters of policy relevant in litigation, and “law,” defined for this purpose as
known and established (but not necessarily determinate) law.38
Burbank, supra note 1, at 915-17.
See id. at 915 (“We know that public support for the Supreme Court as an institution[,] . . .
what political scientists call ‘diﬀuse support[,]’ . . . was consequential in the failure of President
Roosevelt’s court-packing plan.” (citations omitted)).
36 Id. at 916.
37 See generally Burbank, On the Study of Judicial Behaviors, supra note 22.
38 Id. at 46 (citations omitted).
34
35
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Using that framework, I derived a number of lessons from the judicial
behavior literature. The ﬁrst of them was that, as with judicial independence
and accountability,
it is an error to assert or assume that the relationship between “judicial
politics” and “law” is or should be the same with respect to every judge
in a particular judicial system, or indeed that it is or should be the same
even for judges on the same court in every type of case.39
The second lesson was that “in describing judicial behavior, it is an error to
posit a dichotomy between ‘law’ and ‘judicial politics.’ Instead, like judicial
independence and accountability, ‘law’ and ‘judicial politics’ are different sides
of the same coin. They are not opposites but rather complements.”40 The third
lesson was that “as with judicial independence and judicial accountability, the
quantum and quality, or mix, of ‘law’ and ‘judicial politics’ depends, or should
depend, on what a particular polity wants from its courts.”41
And what would a decade in my life with judicial independence and
accountability be without a bad news moment? Asked to write a paper for a
conference exploring—but mostly touting—proposals to abolish life tenure for
Supreme Court justices in favor of one non-renewable eighteen-year term, I
demurred on the ground that I needed to think more about the proposal and the
arguments advanced in its favor than the time available before the conference
would permit. “No problem,” said the organizers, “you can write a paper over
the summer, and we will include it in the published volume.” Well, after a
summer spent with the political science literatures on public knowledge of and
attitudes towards courts and on the behavior of interest groups, I concluded that
this idea—to which many legal academics had subscribed—was a bad idea and
explained why in the paper I sent off to the conference organizers. To say that
they were not pleased would be an understatement. One of them wanted to
rescind the promise of publication, but he was dissuaded by his colleague.42
It turns out that most of the justifications offered in favor of the
proposal did not bear scrutiny.43 Among them was the notion—which only
a law professor could entertain—that the appointments process is the only
check on the independence of the justices, or, put otherwise, the only source
Id. at 47 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 51 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 56-57 (emphasis omitted).
See generally Stephen B. Burbank, An Interdisciplinary Perspective on the Tenure of Supreme
Court Justices, in REFORMING THE COURT: TERM LIMITS FOR SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 317
(Roger C. Cramton & Paul D. Carrington eds., 2006). For a revised and expanded version of this
paper, see Stephen B. Burbank, Alternative Career Resolution II: Changing the Tenure of Supreme Court
Justices, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1511 (2006) [hereinafter Alternative Career Resolution II].
43 See Burbank, Alternative Career Resolution II, supra note 42, at 1515-35.
39
40
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of the Court’s accountability. On the contrary, as political scientists have
long argued and more recently demonstrated empirically, the Court pays
attention both to Congress and to the public. The justices understand that
the Court’s legitimacy, and hence its independence, depends critically on
what the late Richard Arnold called “the continuing consent of the
governed.”44 And from that perspective, another grave problem with the
proposal, which when fully operational would entail two Supreme Court
vacancies during every four-year presidential term, is precisely that it would
increase the incentives of politicians and interest groups to portray justices
as policy agents, cementing the worst tendencies of contemporary politics
by further undermining the rule of law.45
****

Finally, although not directly the subject of my work over the past decade,
judicial independence and (in particular) judicial accountability remain
important themes in that work, most of which has involved collaboration with
the political scientist and law professor Sean Farhang on a project that was
inspired by his brilliant book, The Litigation State.46 There, Sean interrogated
the massive increases in the amount of federal litigation involving federal
statutory and constitutional rights that started in the 1960s.47 Through
painstaking quantitative and qualitative analysis, he showed that the standard
Chamber of Commerce story—which attributes the increase to a litigious
populace, a greedy bar, and an imperial judiciary—is, if not simply wrong,
then radically incomplete.48 For it neglects the fact that starting in the 1960s,
Congress increasingly made conscious decisions to include in legislation it
enacted either pro-plaintiﬀ fee-shifting, enhanced damages provisions, or
both, in order to stimulate private enforcement.49
Our project has been to investigate the ways in which the most important
federal lawmakers in the domain of private enforcement—Congress, those
responsible for court rulemaking under the Rules Enabling Act, and the Supreme
Court—have responded to the growth of the Litigation State. In a series of

44 Richard S. Arnold, Judges and the Public, LITIG., Summer 1983, at 5, 5; Stephen B. Burbank,
Judicial Accountability to the Past, Present, and Future: Precedent, Politics, and Power, 28 U. ARK. LITTLE
ROCK L. REV. 19, 22 (2005).
45 Burbank, Alternative Career Resolution II, supra note 42, at 1535-48; Burbank, supra note 1, at
912-17, 922-26.
46 SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE (2010).
47 See generally id.
48 See generally id.
49 See generally id.
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articles and our recent book,50 we show that, starting in the first Reagan
administration, the growth of litigation as a central instrument to implement
social and economic regulation met opposition emanating primarily from the
rising conservative legal movement and the Republican Party.51 This
counterrevolution fared very differently in those three lawmaking sites, however.
In marked contrast to its substantial failure in Congress52 and only modest
and episodic success in the domain of rulemaking,53 the counterrevolution
against private enforcement of federal rights achieved growing rates of
support, especially over the past several decades, from an increasingly
conservative Supreme Court.54 In cases with at least one dissent, plaintiﬀs’
probability of success when litigating private enforcement issues before the
Supreme Court has been in decline for over forty years.55 By 2014, plaintiﬀs
were losing about 90% of the time, an outcome driven by the votes of
conservative justices.56 Moreover, the eﬀect of ideology on justices’ votes in
private enforcement cases has grown signiﬁcantly larger over time, especially
since about the mid-1990s, during which time the Court’s private
enforcement docket has come to focus increasingly on business regulation
cases and has become associated with increasing advocacy against private
enforcement by the Chamber of Commerce and conservative law reform
organizations.57 Remarkably, at the end of the period we studied, justices were
more ideologically polarized over apparently technical rules of private
enforcement than they were over the actual substantive rights in statutes.58
What explains the variation across institutional sites and the Supreme
Court’s relative success in the counterrevolution to retrench private
enforcement? Four distinguishing institutional characteristics seem to have
the greatest explanatory value.59 First, as contrasted with the institutional
fragmentation of the legislative and rulemaking processes, the Court is
governed by a more streamlined decisional process and simple voting rules,
making it comparatively more capable of unilateral action—by simple
majority vote—on controversial issues.60 Second, in an era of divided
government and party polarization, the Court has faced less credible threats
50 STEPHEN B. BURBANK & SEAN FARHANG, RIGHTS AND RETRENCHMENT: THE
COUNTERREVOLUTION AGAINST FEDERAL LITIGATION (2017).
51 Id. at 25-34.
52 Id. at 34-64.
53 Id. at 65-129.
54 Id. at 130-91.
55 Id. at 21-22.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 220-26.
60 Id.
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of statutory override and, correspondingly, has enjoyed a wider range of
policymaking discretion.61 The growth of the inﬂuence of ideology on
justices’ votes on private enforcement issues after 1994 is consistent with the
hypothesis that the Court exercised wider policymaking discretion during
this period, with the conservative majority pushing the law of private
enforcement more assertively in the anti-enforcement direction, eliciting
greater opposition from the liberal minority.62
Third, courts and the judges who sit on them are far more insulated from
the forces and incentives of democratic politics than elected officials or
rulemakers, which gives the Supreme Court greater freedom to act decisively
on divisive issues.63 Legislators and presidents are democratically accountable
through elections, which limits their ability to retrench existing rights that
enjoy broad popularity.64 Prominent among the influences that doomed the
Reagan administration’s legislative retrenchment initiatives was the fear,
abetted by extensive press coverage, that the public would regard the bills as
further evidence that the administration was hostile to civil rights and,
subsequently, punish the bills’ elected sponsors in the 1984 elections.65
Members of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules are not elected.66 Yet,
rulemaking under the Enabling Act involves the exercise of delegated
legislative power.67 Widespread public perception that the members of the
Advisory Committee, in particular its Article III judge members, were engaged
in ordinary politics could bring the process into disrepute, putting at risk the
major source of the federal judiciary’s power to craft rules of procedure.68
To observe that “courts and the judges who sit on them are far more
insulated from the forces and incentives of democratic politics than elected
officials or rulemakers” is not to say that the Supreme Court is immune to
public opinion.69 As previously observed, the Court’s power in the long run—
its independence—depends on the continued existence of a well of diffuse
support, the depth of which could be adversely affected by a series of unpopular
decisions, particularly decisions perceived to deprive people of rights enjoying
broad support.70 The Court recognizes—or at least some of the justices do—
that public standing and perceived legitimacy are important to its institutional
power, and it therefore is cautious about straying too far or for too long from
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
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Id. at 192-216, 224-26.
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public opinion.71 Consequently, the Court’s need for broad public support
places limits on its ability to scale back highly visible and popular substantive
rights directly.72 When seeking to retrench enforcement of rights that enjoy
broad public support, the Court benefits from strategically steering the
discussion onto apparently technical and legalistic terrain, where the public is
less likely to learn of the decisions at all.73 Because of their lower public
visibility, the Court’s decisions on rights enforcement are less constrained by
public opinion and therefore less tethered to democratic governance.74
In the ﬁrst of the articles leading to our book, Professor Farhang and I
advanced the hypothesis that the strategy of retrenching private enforcement
of rights, rather than the rights themselves, enables justices who share the
goals of the counterrevolution to avoid eroding diﬀuse support for the Court,
even when the decisions in question do not track public opinion, because the
public is unlikely to be aware of them.75 Some readers of that article
challenged the hypothesis by invoking this or that high-proﬁle decision
retrenching private enforcement, such as Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes.76
Accordingly, we undertook an empirical investigation.77 Recognizing that the
media are the primary source of the public’s information about Supreme
Court decisions, we created an original dataset based on content analysis of
newspaper coverage of Supreme Court decisions aﬀecting private
enforcement—such as decisions on damages, fees, and class actions—and
decisions on the associated merits issues. It allowed us to compare the extent
of coverage of Supreme Court decisions ruling on substantive rights to that
of decisions ruling on opportunities and incentives to enforce those rights. As
we expected, Supreme Court decisions on laws relating to the enforcement of
rights receive dramatically less press coverage than decisions on the rights
themselves.78 The media’s role in informing the public about the work of the
Supreme Court declines precipitously when one moves from rulings on rights
to rulings on their enforcement. Thus, the Court’s relative success in
retrenching legal rules salient to private enforcement was fostered by the lower
visibility of its retrenchment efforts as compared to those of Congress or the
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Litigation Reform: An Institutional Approach, 162 U. PA.
L. REV. 1543, 1581-82 (2014).
76 564 U.S. 338 (2011) (reversing certiﬁcation of a national class of female employees allegedly
discriminated against by management).
77 B URBANK & F ARHANG , supra note 50, at 192-216; Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang,
The Subterranean Counterrevolution: The Supreme Court, the Media, and Litigation Reform,
65 D EP AUL L. R EV. 293 (2016).
78 BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 50, at 201-03.
71
72
73
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Advisory Committee. The story of retrenchment of private enforcement by
court decision is one of substantial change effected in large part by many
comparatively small acts of lawmaking over decades, few of which garnered
much public or press attention. As Paul Pierson put it, such slow-moving
processes of retrenchment may be “invisible at the surface” while producing
“long-term erosion”—like “termites working on a foundation.”79
Dependent on the media for information about the Court’s work, most
members of the public have not been aware that the Court has sapped the
value of their statutory and constitutional rights by making it more difficult
to enforce them. The resulting lack of accountability has freed the justices to
do indirectly what prudent management of the institution’s perceived
legitimacy would prevent them from doing directly. The Court recognizes that
its public standing is not hurt by decisions that the public does not learn about.
The media must recognize, then, that by not covering the Court’s private
enforcement cases, they are enabling the subterranean counterrevolution.
This is not the only democratic deficit that our work reveals. A majority of
the cases in our data involved the interpretation of private enforcement regimes
in federal statutes, and in 79% of the cases, plaintiffs were asserting federal
statutory rights.80 One need not subscribe to a naïve or simplistic view of federal
courts as wholly beyond democratic control or of Congress as resembling a New
England town meeting in order to believe that judicial subversion of legislation
raises troubling questions from the standpoint of democratic values.
To be sure, Congress sometimes intentionally fails to resolve foreseeable
and controversial issues for strategic reasons, delegating policymaking
authority to courts. When democratically accountable legislators intentionally
license courts to resolve issues left unaddressed, regarding the ensuing judicial
policymaking as undemocratic is mistaken. But this account does not fit the
Court’s increasingly assertive anti-private enforcement posture. There is no
legislative license for retrenchment though judicial interpretation. The bulk of
the laws on which the Litigation State was founded were passed by Democratic
congresses distrustful of an administrative state under Republican presidential
leadership. The conservative wing of the Court mounted a campaign against
private enforcement with the goal of demobilizing those private lawsuits.
Rather than carrying out an implicit legislative mandate to make policy choices
that Congress sought to avoid, the conservative wing of the Court is better
understood as seeking to enfeeble legislative policy with which it disagrees and
doing so by means that avoid accountability.
79 Paul Pierson, The Rise and Reconﬁguration of Activist Government, in THE TRANSFORMATION
AMERICAN POLITICS: ACTIVIST GOVERNMENT AND THE RISE OF CONSERVATISM 19, 33
(Paul Pierson & Theda Skocpol eds., 2007).
80 BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 50, at 233-39.
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****
Judicial independence and judicial accountability present challenges that
are fascinating, diﬃcult, and of the utmost importance to our democracy.
Laws, we are told, are “those wise restraints that make us free.”81 Experience
over the last two years has reminded us that, in times of aspiring
authoritarianism in the executive branch and serial subservience in the
legislative branch, independent and accountable courts are the bulwark of our
freedoms. Those who lived through Watergate should not need the reminder.
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